Deadline New national-security systems must be CNSA 2.0 by default from January 1, 2027. See the timeline
210 Security
210 Security

Post-quantum cryptography · Threat modeling · Identity

Know what you run.
Model what breaks.

210 Security finds quantum-vulnerable cryptography, models how an adversary would attack the systems around it, and runs the remediation — with the PKI, identity, and Zero Trust expertise to make it stick.

  • Vendor-neutral
  • Works with your PKI, HSMs, and cloud
  • Threat Model Agent, from design to operations

Products

Two products. One operating picture.

Cipher Posture finds and fixes quantum-vulnerable cryptography. Threat Model Agent models the whole system — trust boundaries, abuse cases, identity delegation, application risk, and cryptography — and re-models as the architecture changes. They share an inventory when used together.

Product · Post-quantum

Cipher Posture

Find, rank, and fix every quantum-vulnerable algorithm.

Discover → Migrate → Operate

  1. 01

    Discover

    Every algorithm, key, and certificate, including inherited dependencies.

  2. 02

    Analyze

    Sequence by data lifespan, obligation, and migration cost.

  3. 03

    Migrate

    Hybrid TLS, PQC issuance, and quantum-safe signing, staged and reversible.

  4. 04

    Operate

    Continuous drift detection and audit-ready evidence.

Product · Threat modeling

Threat Model Agent

From any description to a threat model you can act on.

Design → Develop → Operate

  1. 01

    Ingest

    Notes, repositories, documents, diagrams, SBOMs and CBOMs — mixed in one run.

  2. 02

    Model

    Components, data flows, trust boundaries and assumptions, reviewed before analysis.

  3. 03

    Analyze

    The frameworks you choose, compliance mapping, scanners and a PQC pass.

  4. 04

    Act

    Evidence-checked threats, fixes with Where and Verify, tracking and PR checks.

The clock

The deadlines are already in your contracts.

This is no longer a research question. It is a set of dated obligations that arrive through acquisition, procurement, and audit — and each one needs an inventory you probably do not have yet.

Dates below are drawn from public policy. We link every one to its primary source, and we say so when a document is still a draft.

NSA in 62 days

January 1, 2027

CNSA 2.0 becomes the acquisition default

Federal in 1,522 days

December 31, 2030

PQC key establishment on high-value and high-impact systems

Federal in 1,887 days

December 31, 2031

PQC digital signatures on high-value and high-impact systems

Countdowns computed in your browser

Full timeline, with sources

Why this is hard

Three things are true at once.

Standard

The algorithms you use today have an expiry date.

NIST IR 8547 proposes deprecating RSA, ECDSA, EdDSA, and classical Diffie-Hellman after 2030 and disallowing them after 2035. The document is still a draft; the direction is not.

NIST IR 8547 · draft

Obligation

The threat model is now evidence.

EU Cyber Resilience Act reporting duties began on 11 September 2026, with full manufacturer obligations from 11 December 2027. Risk assessment and technical documentation are expected — a model nobody can produce on request is a liability.

EU CRA · 11 September 2026

Exposure

Confidentiality is retroactive.

Traffic captured today can be decrypted once a cryptographically relevant quantum computer exists. If the data must stay secret for 10–15 years, waiting is an accepted exposure.

Harvest now, decrypt later

Most organizations can name their crown jewels. Far fewer can show the threat model that explains how an attacker reaches them.

The modeling problem

How we work

Six weeks to a plan you can defend.

Fixed scope, fixed duration, and a deliverable your sponsor can take to a board. If the inventory cannot support a decision, we say so before you spend the migration budget.

  1. 01 Weeks 1–3

    Baseline

    We discover what you actually run, resolve ownership, and produce a versioned CBOM. No assumptions, no inherited blind spots.

  2. 02 Weeks 3–5

    Sequence

    We rank by harvest-now-decrypt-later exposure and obligation, then agree the roadmap, owners, and the first migrations.

  3. 03 Week 6 onward

    Prove

    We migrate in reversible steps and leave behind the automation, policy, and evidence that keeps the estate at standard.

Where we start

Start from the obligation you actually have.

A federal contractor, a payments processor, and a utility share the same algorithm problem and none of the same constraints. Choose the door that matches your deadline.

All solutions

FAQ

The questions we get asked first.

Short answers. If yours is not here, ask it directly — we answer email.

What is post-quantum cryptography?

Post-quantum cryptography is a set of algorithms designed to resist attack by both classical and quantum computers. NIST standardized the first three in August 2024: ML-KEM for key establishment, and ML-DSA and SLH-DSA for digital signatures. They are intended to replace RSA and elliptic-curve cryptography, which a sufficiently large quantum computer could break.

Why migrate before a quantum computer exists?

Because encrypted data can be captured now and decrypted later. If your data must stay confidential for more than 10–15 years, waiting is not a neutral decision — it is an accepted exposure. The regulatory deadlines also assume you start early: new national-security acquisitions expect CNSA 2.0 from January 2027, and federal high-value systems have PQC requirements by 2030 and 2031.

What does Threat Model Agent actually produce?

A system threat model with trust boundaries and data flows, a threat register with owners and mitigations, abuse cases and security test cases, and change diffs when the architecture moves. It is not a crypto-only model: application, identity, and abuse-case threats are first-class, and the CBOM and identity inventory are inputs when available.

Is Threat Model Agent a scanner?

No. Scanners find implementation defects in code that already exists. The agent starts from the architecture and asks what an adversary would do to it. Scanner findings can be an input, but they are not the model.

What is a CBOM?

A cryptographic bill of materials is a machine-readable inventory of the cryptographic assets in a system: algorithms, keys, certificates, protocols, and the libraries that implement them. The July 2026 executive order directs CISA and NIST to publish minimum CBOM elements, which will make it a standard procurement artifact rather than a good idea.

Do you replace our PKI or identity team?

No. We work alongside them. Most of our engagements leave your team with automation, policy, and runbooks they own. Where we build, we build with your engineers pairing on the work so the knowledge stays after the engagement ends.

Next step

Find out what you are actually running.

A 45-minute readiness briefing: your obligations, your exposure, and the first three things to fix. No slideware.